2015年6月cet六级新题型模拟试题及答案解析（2）
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Part Ⅲ Reading Comprehension (40 minutes)(原快速阅读理解调整为长篇阅读理解，篇章长度和难度不变。篇章后附有10个句子，每句一题。每句所含的信息出自篇章的某一段落，要求考生找出与每句所含信息相匹配的段落。) Section B Directions: In this section, you are going to read a passage with ten statements attached to it. Each statement contains information given in one of the paragraphs. Identify the paragraph from which the information is derived. You may choose a paragraph more than once. Each paragraph is marked with a letter. Answer the questions by marking the corresponding letter on Answer Sheet 2. Five Problems Financial Reform Doesn’t Fix [A] The legislation concerning financial reform focuses on helping regulators detect and defuse (减少 的危险性)the next crisis. But it doesn’t address many of the underlying conditions that can cause problems. [B ] The legislation gives regulators the power to oversee shadow banks and take failing firms apart? convenes a council of superregulators to watch the megafirms that pose a risk to the full financial system, and much else. [C] But the bill does more to help regulators detect the next financial crisis than to actually stop it from happening. In that way, it’s like the difference between improving public health and improving medicine: The bill focuses on helping the doctors who figure out when you’re sick and how to get you better rather than on the conditions (sewer systems and air quality and hygiene standards and so on) that contribute to whether you get sick in the first place. [D] That is to say, many of the weaknesses and imbalances that led to the financial crisis will survive our regulatory response, and it’s important to keep that in mind. So here are five we still have to watch out for: 1. The Global Glut (供过于求)of Savings [E] “One of the leading indicators of a financial crisis is when you have a sustained surge in money flowing into the country which makes borrowing cheaper and easier,” says Harvard economist Kenneth Rogoff. Our crisis was no different: Between 1987 and 1999, our current account deficit—the measure of how much money is coming in versus going out—fluctuated between 1 and 2 percent of gross domestic product. By 2006, it had hit 6 percent. [F] The sharp rise was driven by emerging economies with lots of growth and few investment opportunities—think China—funneling their money to developed economies with less growth and lots of investment opportunities. But we’ve gotten out of the crisis without fixing it. China is still growing fast, exporting faster, and sending the money over to US. 2. Household Debt—and Why We Need It [G] The fact that money is available to borrow doesn’t explain why Americans borrowed so much of it. Household debt as a percentage of GDP went from a bit less than 60 percent at the beginning of the 1990s to a bit less than 100 percent in 2006. “This is where I come to income inequality,” says Raghuram Rajan, an economist at the University of Chicago. “A large part of the population saw relatively stagnant incomes over the 1980s and 1990s. Credit was so welcome because it kept people who were falling behind reasonably happy. You were keeping up, even if your income wasn’t.” [H] Incomes, of course, are even more stagnant now that unemployment is at 9 percent. And that pain isn，t being shared equally: inequality has actually risen since before the recession, as joblessness is proving sticky among the poor, but recovery has been swift for the rich. Household borrowing is still more than 90 percent of GDP, and the conditions that drove it up there are, if anything, worse. 3. The “Shadow Banking” Market [I] The financial crisis started out similarly severe, but it wasn’t, at first, a crisis of consumers. It was a crisis of banks. It never became a crisis of consumers because consumer deposits are insured. But large investors— pension funds, banks, corporations, and others—aren’t insured. But when they hear that their collateral (F付属担 保品)is dropping in value, they demand their money back. And when everyone does that at once, it’s like an old-fashioned bank run: The banks can，t pay everyone off at once, so they unload all their assets to get capital, the assets become worthless because everyone is trying to unload them, and the banks collapse. [J] “This is an inherent problem of privately created money,” says Gary Gorton, an economist at Princeton University, “It is vulnerable to these kinds of runs.” This year, we’re bringing this shadow banking system under the control of regulators and giving them all sorts of information on it and power over it, but we’re not doing anything like deposit insurance, where we simply make the deposits safe so runs become an anachronism. 4. Rich Banks [K] In the 1980s, the financial sector’s share of total corporate profits ranged from about 10 to 20 percent. By 2004, it was about 35 percent. Simon Johnson, an economist at MIT, recalls a conversation he had with a fund manager. “The guy said to me, ‘ Simon, it’s so little money! You can sway senators for $10 million!? ’ ” Johnson laughs ruefully (后,悔地).“These guys [big investors ] don%t even think in millions. They think in billions.” [L ] What you get for that money is favors. The last financial crisis fades from memory and the public begins to focus on other things. Then the finance guys begin nudging (游说).They hold some fundraisers for politicians, make some friends, explain how the regulations they’re under are onerous and unfair. And slowly, surely, those regulations come undone. This financial crisis will stick in our minds for a while, but not forever. And after briefly dropping to less than 15 percent of corporate profits, the financial sector has rebounded to more than 30 percent. They’ll have plenty of money with which to help their friends forget this whole nasty affair. 5. Lax (不严格的)Regulators [M] The most troubling prospect is the chance that this bill, if we’d passed it in 2000, wouldn’t even have prevented this financial crisis. That’s not to undersell it: It would’ve given regulators more information with which to predict the crisis. But they had enough information, and they ignored it. They get caught up in boom times just like everyone else. A bubble, almost by definition, affects the regulators with the power to pop it. [N] In 2005, with housing prices running far, far ahead of the historical trend, Bernanke said a housing bubble was “ a pretty unlikely possibility ”. In 2007, he said Fed officials “ do not expect significant spillovers from the subprime market to the rest of the economy.” Alan Greenspan, looking back at the financial crisis, admitted in April that regulators “have had a woeful record of chronic failure. History tells us they cannot identify the timing of a crisis, or anticipate exactly where it will be located or how large the losses and spillovers will be.” 46. In the 1980s and 1990s people experienced no substantial increase in terms of income, which brought about the popularity of credit. 47. Financial crisis is a crisis of banks in that shadow banking may cause banks to fail. 48. The finance guys make friends with politicians in the hope of making some burdensome and unfair regulations cancelled. 49. The legislation concerning financial reform offers regulators the power of supervising shadow banks and disintegrating companies on the verge of bankruptcy. 50. In terms of the effect of unemployment, it is more deeply felt by the poor than by the rich. 51. Even if there was enough information to predict there would be financial crisis, the regulators still chose to ignore it. 52. Emerging economies with insufficient investment opportunities have invested much money in developed countries. 53. Regulators with power tended to fail again and again concerning forecasting a financial crisis. 54. A fund manager or large investor is considered absurdly rich by an economist from MIT. 55. Large investors, deposits can be made safer if shadow banking system is under the control of regulators. Part Ⅳ Translation (30 minutes)(原单句汉译英调整为段落汉译英。翻译内容涉及中国的历史、文化、经济、社会发展等。四级长度为140-160个汉字;六级长度为180-200个汉字。) Directions: For this part, you are allowed 30 minutes to translate a passage from Chinese into English. You should write your answer on Answer Sheet 2. 要了解中国文化，就应该对中国的戏曲文化有所了解。中国地方戏种类很多，其中京剧是一个具有代表 性的剧种。作为一个独立的剧种，京剧的诞生大约是在1840年至I860年。京剧是在吸收其他地方戏营养的基础 上形成的。京剧有明确的角色分工;在念白上用北京方言;在音乐上以胡琴为主要伴奏乐器。由于京剧是在融合各种地方戏之精华的基础上形成的，所以它不仅为北京的观众所钟爱，也受到全国人民的喜爱。 答案 Part Ⅲ Reading Comprehension Section B 46. [G]。题干意为，20世纪80年代和90年代的人没有经历过收入的实质性增长，这使信贷受到欢迎。注意抓住 题干中的关键时间词1980s and 1990s, income和credit。这些关键词在[G]段出现，该段第四句提到，20世纪 80年代和90年代的大部分人收入相对滞后。原文中的stagnant与题干中的no substantial increase为同义转 述;接着第五句提到，信贷非常受欢迎，因为它使那些落在后面的人感受到了一定的快乐，原文中的was so welcome和题干中的popularity为同义转述。 47. [I]。题干意为，金融危机是银行的危机，因为影子银行有可能导致银行倒闭。注意抓住题干中的关键词a crisis of banks和fail。文章段落中，提到影子银行的内容在[I]和[J]段出现，其中[I]段第二句即提到金融危 机是银行的危机，与题干前半部分对应;接着后文讲述了金融危机会导致银行倒闭，以此来解释第二句。 本段最后一个单词collapse与题干中的fail对应。 48. [L]。题干意为，金融家与政客结交朋友的目的是希望一些繁重不公的规则能够被取消。注意抓住题干中 的关键词make friends with politicians和burdensome and unfair regulations。文章段落中，谈及与政客交朋友 的内容在[L]段出现，本段第四句提到，金融家为政客们组织资金筹措者，和政客们结交朋友，抱怨他们 所要遵守的规则是多么的繁重和不公。接着后面一句说，慢慢地，这些规则一定会被取消。由此可知，金融 家与政客结交朋友的目的是希望获得政客的支持，来取消一些繁重不公的规则。题干中的burdensome对应 原文中的 onerous。 49. [B]。题干意为，有关金融改革的立法赋予监管机构监管影子银行和解体濒临破产的公司的权力。注意抓 住题干中的关键词 the legislation concerning financial reform, shadow banks和companies on the verge of bankruptcy。文章段落中，谈及有关金融改革的立法对影子银行和濒临破产的公司的影响的内容在[B]段 出现，本段指出，该法案赋予监管机构监管影子银行和解体濒临破产公司的权力。由此可知，题干是对原 文的同义转述，故答案为[B]。 50. [H]。题干意为，关于失业的影响，穷人比富人感触更深。注意抓住题干中的关键词unemployment, the poor 和the rich。文章段落中，谈及失业以及失业对人们的影响的内容在[H]段出现，本段指出，失业的痛苦对 人们的影响并不均等：事实上，在经济衰退以前，这种不平等就已经加剧，这是因为失业者中穷人居多， 而经济复苏对富人来说所需时间很短。由此可知，穷人对失业的感触比富人深，题干是对原文的同义转 述，故答案为[H]。 51. [M]。题干意为，尽管监管者掌握了足够的信息来预测这场金融危机，但是他们仍然选择忽视这些信息。 注意抓住题干中的关键词enough information, financial crisis和ignore。文章段落中，提到监管机构忽视预测 金融危机的信息的内容在[M]段出现，本段第三句提到，监管者已经有了足够的信息，却忽视了这些信 息。题干中的enough information和ignore都是原文原词的复现。 52. [F]。题干意为，没有足够投资机会的新兴经济体已经在发达国家投资了很多钱。注意抓住题干中的关键 词emerging economies和developed countries。文章段落中，提到新兴经济体的内容在[F]段出现，本段第一 句提到，增长迅猛且投资机会少的新兴经济体促使这一数字急剧上升，比如中国，它们将大量的资金投资 于增长速度慢但投资机会多的发达国家。由此可知，题干是对原文的同义转述。故答案为[F]。 53. [N]。题干意为，监管机构在预测金融危机时往往接连失败。注意抓住题干中的关键词fail和forecasting。文 章段落中，提及监管机构能否很好地预测金融危机的内容在[N]段出现，本段倒数第二句引用艾伦•格林 斯潘的话，指出监管机构“长期以来表现得很糟糕”，接着最后一句作了具体阐释：它们无法确定危机发生 的时间，也不能准确预测危机发生的地点以及损失和后果的严重性。由此可知，题干是对原文的同义转 述。原文倒数第二句中的chronic failure对应题干中的fail again and again;最后一句中的anticipate对应题干 中的 forecasting。 54. [K]。题干意为，一位来自麻省理工学院的经济学家认为基金管理人或大投资者富有得离谱。注意抓住题 干中的关键词fund manager和economist from MIT。文章段落中，提及麻省理工学院的经济学家西蒙•约翰 逊的段落为[K]段，在本段中西蒙•约翰逊回忆起他与一位基金管理人的谈话，并笑称：“这些家伙(大投 资者们)想事情的时候可不是以百万为单位的，而是以十亿为单位。”可见，他认为基金管理人是非常有钱 的，题干与原文意思一致，故答案为[K]。 55. [J]。题干意为，如果能将影子银行系统置于监管机构的控制之下，则可以提升大投资者的存款的安全性。 注意抓住题干中的关键词deposits和safer。文章段落中，提及使存款更加安全的内容在[J]段出现，本段最 后一句指出，我们将影子银行系统置于监管机构的控制之下……仅仅是在保证存款安全。这里所说的存款 安全即指大投资者的存款安全。题干是对原文的同义转述，故答案为[J]。 Part Ⅳ Translation 参考答案 To understand the Chinese culture, you have to know something about the Chinese opera culture. In China, there are many kinds of local operas, among which Peking Opera is a representative one. As an independent opera form, Peking Opera was approximately born between 1840 and I860. Peking opera originated from absorbing the essentials of other local operas. In Peking Opera there is a clear division of roles; the spoken parts are in Beijing dialect; and huqin, is the main accompaniment instrument. Since Peking Opera has combined the cream of various local operas, it is enjoyed not only by Beijing audience, but also by people all over the country. 难点精析 1.要了解中国文化，就应该对中国的戏曲文化有所了解：该句没有给出明确的主语，因而在翻译时要注意：增译主语you。“中国的戏曲文化”可译为the Chinese opera culture。 2.中国地方戏种类很多，其中京剧是一个具有代表性的剧种：该句在翻译时可以采用非限定性定语从句结构。该句可译为：In China, there are many kinds of local operas, among which Peking Opera is a representative one.注意此处为了避免在前后分句中重复使用名词opera而在后半句中使用了名词性替代词 one。 3.京剧是在吸收其他地方戏营养的基础上形成的：“在……的基础上形成”如果直接译为be formed on the I basis of...会稍显生硬，因而可以灵活译为originate from...。“地方戏”可以直译为local opera。 4.念白：“念白”指的是中国戏曲中人物的独白或者两者的对话，因而此处在翻译时可将其灵活译为the I spoken parts。 5.胡琴：这一特有名词在英文中并没有直接对应的词汇或表达，因而可以采用汉语拼音表示。 6.它不仅为北京的观众所钟爱，也受到全国人民的喜爱：“不仅 也 ”常用not only…but also…来表达。此处句中的“钟爱”和“喜爱”同义，在翻译后半部分内容时可以将与前半部分重复的内容省略，故该部分内容可译为：it is enjoyed not only by Beijing audience, but also by people all over the country。 相关资料 |
